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When examining salaries in labor markets, economists observe the characteris-
tics of individual workers, employers, and jobs and seek to measure their impact on
wages and salaries. In this paper we investigate and report on the determinants of
salaries in the academic labor market for entry-level economists. Previous studies
focusing on this market have explored the impact of gender and age on salaries [Formby
et al., 1993; Barbezat, 1992; Raymond et al., 1988; McMillen and Singell, 1994]. The
effects of academic reputation and departmental rankings of Ph.D. programs from
which newly hired economists receive their degrees have also been investigated
[Ehrenberg et al., 1998].
More recently, Siegfried and Stock [1999; 2001] provided a more extensive analy-
sis of the labor market for entry-level economists by examining employment outcomes
and salaries of a large sample of new Ph.D.s and whether they accepted jobs in
academia, worked for a government agency, or went into the private sector. Their
findings provide compelling evidence concerning variations in salaries across broad
employment sectors. Our paper is more narrowly focused and reports on the results
of a survey of the academic labor market for economists hired by four-year colleges
and universities at the beginning of the 1998-99 academic year. The survey is similar
in design to the one used by Formby et al. [1993], which reported results for the 1987-
88 academic year. In our survey, an aggressive follow-up strategy resulted in a re-
sponse rate of over 66 percent, which yields reliable information on the salaries and
characteristics of economists hired into the academic labor market in 1998.
Many of the findings relating to the determinants of entry-level salaries are not
surprising. The paper provides hard evidence concerning what many observers per-
ceive as the way the entry-level market works. For example, it is not surprising that
being hired into a tenure-track job results in a large and highly significant salary
premium. However, we are able to provide information concerning the number of510 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
economists hired into tenure-track and non-tenure-track positions and about other
factors influencing salaries. Further, we show that the ranking of the department in
which the newly hired economist did their Ph.D. work is highly correlated with the
beginning salary and the quality of their job placement, as evidenced by the ranking
of the hiring department. In addition, we provide evidence that indicates the market
works quite differently depending upon whether the hiring department is ranked in
terms of the research productivity of its faculty.
THE SURVEY AND A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CHANGES IN ENTRY-
LEVEL HIRING ACROSS TIME
Colleges and universities that were seeking to hire academic economists for the
1998-99 academic year were identified in two ways. First, we compiled a list of all
academic institutions that advertised in the October or November 1997 issues of Job
Openings for Economists (JOE). To this list we added all four-year colleges and uni-
versities that advertised open positions for economists in The Chronicle of Higher
Education. An easy-to-complete survey form was mailed in mid-December 1998 to
675 potential employers. A total of 450 responses were received. Some responses were
initially incomplete and extensive follow-up resulted in more completed survey forms.
However, in a number of cases we were unsuccessful in securing missing data and
these partial responses were not analyzed. Of the 450 complete responses, 42 did not
include salary information. An additional 58 responses lacked necessary demographic
information. The 179 respondents who noted that no new hires had been made at the
entry level were also excluded. The remaining 207 surveys were used to construct a
data set with completed responses.1 This sample is somewhat smaller than the simi-
lar survey of Formby et al. [1993], which had a usable sample of 268 observations for
new hires in the 1987-1988 academic year.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. In the fall of 1998 the average salary of a
newly hired academic economist was $51,842, with a standard deviation of $10,664.
This compares to the fall 1987 mean salary (restated in 1998 dollars) of $45,258 re-
ported by Formby et al. [1993]. Thus, on average, real entry-level salaries rose by
slightly less than 13 percent over the decade separating the surveys. Several other
summary statistics of general interest warrant mention. Table 1 reveals that 143
(69.1 percent) of the entry-level economists hired in the fall of 1998 were men whose
salaries averaged $52,148. Women made up 30.9 percent of the sample with salaries
averaging $50,980. Thus the nominal salaries of women averaged 97.8 percent of
comparable salaries of men. A decade earlier women accounted for 21.3 percent of
new hires and their nominal salaries averaged 96.7 percent of men’s salaries. Thus, it
appears that gender-related average salaries have changed little across time;2 but the
number of women economists, as a share of all entry-level academic economists, has
increased.
Two other differences in salaries in Table 1 are quite striking and are briefly
discussed here. First, the salary differentials among economists hired into ranked
and unranked departments appear to have expanded across time. Before summariz-
ing specific findings with respect to departmental ranking, we briefly outline the logic511 ENTRY-LEVEL ACADEMIC SALARIES
of considering rankings and describe the ranking criterion. The rank of a department
may be a proxy for the quality of the training economists receive as graduate stu-
dents. Further, hiring departments may use the rank of the Ph.D. producing depart-
ment as a signal of the quality and expected future productivity of the newly hired
economist. Hiring departments that want to maintain or move up in the rankings
have to compete for talent and may be willing to pay a premium to insure that they
hire the most promising candidates. In Formby et al. [1993] the ranking of depart-
ments came from Hirsch et al. [1984]. We use a similar but more recent ranking by
Scott and Mitias [1996] in which 240 departments are ranked based on the total num-
ber of published pages in selected journals by their faculty from 1984 through 1993.
The number of published pages, of course, is only one dimension of the quality of a
department. At best, it measures the research productivity of the faculty. Neverthe-
less, research productivity is a much-discussed attribute of quality, and we have a
systematic measure of the variable for a large number of colleges and universities in
our sample. Departments that did not make it into Scott and Mitias’ [1996] research
productivity rankings are referred to as “unranked”.
TABLE 1
Sample Sizes and Summary Statistics for Selected Variables
 N             Mean         Standard Deviation
Total 207 $51,842 10,664
Male 143 $52,148 10,988
Female 64 $50,980 9,949
Ph.D. 181 $52,941 9,923
A.B.D. 26 $43,752 12,325
Tenure Track 161 $54,344 9,732
Non-Tenure Track 46 $42,836 8,880
Published 128 $52,579 10,524
Not Published 79 $50,502 10,840
Hiring School
Ranked 132 $55,870 9,335
Unranked 75 $44,600 8,967
Ranked-Top 50 40 $61,038 10,280
Unranked and below 50 167 $49,571 9,530
Business 63 $52,957 11,652
Non-business 144 $51,275 10,207
Private 83 $51,283 11,111
Public 124 $52,124 10,392
Ranked/Tenure 111 $57,836 8,509
Ranked/Non-tenure 21 $45,476 6,141
Unranked/Tenure 49 $46,717 7,628
Unranked/Non-tenure 25 $40,617 10,257
Graduate Institution of Person Hired
Private 69 $54,294 9367
Public 138 $50,532 11082512 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Table 1 reveals that average salaries in hiring departments that were ranked in
terms of scholarly research productivity were 25 percent higher, in 1998, compared to
unranked departments. A decade earlier the differentials were somewhat smaller,
but still a sizable 17 percent. While the salary differential between ranked and
unranked departments widened across time, the proportion of new hires accepting
entry-level academic jobs in ranked departments was approximately the same in 1998
as in 1987 (34.7 vs. 36.2 percent).
A second noteworthy difference in Table 1 is the salaries of economists hired into
jobs that are on and off the tenure track. In some academic disciplines, notably in the
humanities, a growing proportion of the faculty are in jobs that can never lead to
tenure. The existence and growth of non-tenure-track jobs are widely perceived as a
serious problem within some segments of the academic community. One of the objec-
tives of the paper is to establish some basic data concerning non-tenure-track jobs in
the entry-level market for economists. Table 1 reveals that 46 of the 207 (22.3 per-
cent) newly hired economists did not receive tenure-track jobs in 1998-99. Further,
the salary differences associated with the tenure track are striking. Economists hired
in tenure-track jobs received an average salary of $54,344. In contrast, the salaries of
economists hired in non-tenure-track jobs averaged $42,836. Thus, the nominal dif-
ference in average salaries suggests a premium of over 21 percent. Unfortunately,
whether the proportion of economics positions filled by hiring on and off the tenure
track has increased across time cannot be addressed because earlier surveys were not
designed to address this issue.3
THE EARNINGS EQUATION AND DATA
The literature from labor economics suggests that the proper form for estimating
an earnings equation for entry-level economists is:
Ln Ei = a +  bjXji + Ui,
where Ei denotes the salary of the ith entry-level economist, Xj refers to a vector of
earnings determinants, bj represents the parameters to be estimated, and Ui is an
error term with a zero mean and constant variance.
The explanatory variables used in estimating the earnings equation are shown in
Table 2. The meanings of most of the variables are clear and require little comment,
but others are not as clear and we briefly discuss them here. The first set of variables
in Table 2 relate to characteristics of the departments hiring an entry-level economist
or characteristics of the department at which the new hire studied for the Ph.D. de-
gree. The H-productivity variable measures the number of pages published from 1984
through 1993 by the faculty in the school that hired the new entry-level economist.
The P-productivity variable measures the number of pages published over the same
period by the faculty in the department in which the new hire did her or his Ph.D.
work. As discussed above, these productivity variables are sometimes interpreted as
proxies for the quality of departments hiring and producing economists in the entry-
level market for economists.513 ENTRY-LEVEL ACADEMIC SALARIES
The COL index requires some explanation. We used the Cost of Living calculator
found on the website of www.homefair.com. This website provides a measure of the
change in the cost of living, holding income constant, for a person who moves from
one city to another in the fall of 1998. For our purposes we chose a city (Orlando, FL)
with an index value of 100 as the base. We then normalized the cost of living in all
other areas relative to that in Orlando, which is set to 100. The homefair.com costs of
living indices are constructed based upon procedures prescribed by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics and are similar to the American Chamber of Commerce Research
Association (ACCRA) COL measures, which are available for a limited number of
urban areas.4
Highest Degree and Business School are categorical variables indicating whether
the hiring department offers a Ph.D. degree and whether it is administratively lo-
cated in a business school. Hires is also a categorical variable that indicates whether
the hiring department employed two or more new entry-level economists rather than
one. In Formby et al. [1993] this variable was found to be statistically significant and
we include it in our model to see if this variable continues to be significant a decade
later.
The second set of variables in Table 2 relates to the personal characteristics of
individual entry-level economists hired into academic positions in the fall of 1998.
The Ph.D. variable indicates whether the newly hired economist had a completed
degree when she or he started working. The Gender variable is another categorical
variable, which is coded 1 for males.
Variables 1-10 were analyzed by Formby et al. [1993] in their study of the deter-
minants of entry-level salaries of academic economists in 1987-1988. To these we add
the variables numbered 11-14, all of which are categorical. The survey requested
information on both race and country of national origin. Sample sizes were very small
for African Americans, and for this reason we coded the data to create a variable
indicating whether the new hire was a white non-Hispanic person (n = 158) or “other”
(n = 49), with the latter group including African Americans, persons of Hispanic ori-
gin, and Asians. The variable Published indicates whether the new hire had pub-
lished a paper (or had a paper accepted for publication) at the time of initial appoint-
ment. Surprisingly, Table 1 reveals that more than 60 percent of all new hires were
reported by their hiring department to have published at least one paper. It should be
noted, however, that we did not ask about the quality of the publication. Tenure Track
shows whether an individual was hired on the tenure track. As noted above, slightly
more than 20 percent of the sample were hired into non-tenure-track jobs. Citizen/
Green Card indicates whether the person hired was a U.S. citizen or held a green
card.5
THE DETERMINANTS OF ENTRY-LEVEL ACADEMIC SALARIES, 1998-99
Table 3 reports estimates for two alternative models of entry-level academic sala-
ries. Model 1 is shown in column 1 and is estimated using all observations. Model 2
reports separate estimates for ranked and unranked departments. Column 2 reports
estimates for ranked departments and column 3 shows similar estimates for unranked
departments. The question of which of these models provides the best explanation of514 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
entry-level salaries is addressed by applying a Chow test, which is briefly explained
below. But first, we provide further discussion of some of the variables and highlight
general findings that emerge from both models.
The rankings of Scott and Mitias [1996] reveal that the lowest-ranked depart-
ment published only 33.7 pages over a nine-year span, for an average 3.74 pages per
year. We therefore coded all unranked departments as having a productivity mea-
sure of zero.
For ranked departments, an insignificant positive coefficient on H-productivity
would seem problematic. Ehrenberg et al. [1998] shows, among other things, that
more productive (higher-ranked) departments pay higher salaries to new hires. Fur-
ther investigation reveals that the salary premium paid by higher-ranked depart-
ments is actually a result of the training that the new hire received.
The positive and significant sign on P-productivity in Model 1 reveals that every
100 published pages by the producing department carries a salary premium of 1.92
percent over the sample period.6 Higher-ranked departments hired persons from
higher-ranked departments and consequently paid a salary premium for them. No
person hired in the top 10 departments received their degree from a department ranked
lower than 10, suggesting that higher-ranked schools seek out persons from their
own ranks. Because elite programs only hire top-ranked persons, it may appear that
these programs pay a premium.
Comparing the effects of the variables across the estimates in the two models
yields some interesting findings. In the discussion that follows we employ a difference
TABLE 2
Definitions of Variables
Characteristics of Hiring and Producing Departments
1.   H-Productivity Productivity of the hiring department
2.   P-Productivity Productivity of the producing department
3.   Ranked Status of hiring department (ranked department = 1, not ranked =0)
4.   Public Major source of funding for the hiring departments’ college or university (public =
1, other = 0)
5.   COL Cost of living for the geographical area where the hiring department is located
6.   Highest Degree Highest degree offered by the hiring department (Ph.D = 1, other=0)
7.   Business School The administrative location of the hiring department (business school=1, other=0)
8.   Hires Number of entry-level economists hired by the hiring department (multiple
hires=1, single hire=0)
Characteristics of the Individual Entry Level Economist
9.   Ph.D. Degree status at the time the survey was completed (Ph.D. = 1, A.B.D.=0)
10. Gender Gender of new hire (male=1, female=0)
11. Race Race and ethnicity of the new hire [white (non-Hispanic) = 1, other =0]
12. Published Publication record at the time the survey was completed (published=1, no publi-
cations=0)
13. Tenure Track Hiring status (tenure track=1, other=0)
14. Citizen/Green Card Citizenship or green card status of the New hire (U.S. citizen or green card =1,
other=0)
Dependent Variable
15. Salary Academic year salary of the new hire without summer bonuses or other compen-
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TABLE 3
Determinants of Academic Salaries of Entry-Level Economists
Model 1 Model 2
Entire Ranked Unranked
Survey Departments Departments
Intercept 10.3460a 10.4514a 10.3542a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H Productivity 0.1433x10 4 1.16x10 5 —
(0.2370) (0.267) —
Public 0.0048 0.0206 0.0294
(0.8555) (0.466) (0.579)
COL 0.0010 0.0010 0.0004
(0.1520) (0.137) (0.831)
Highest Degree 0.0914a 0.0418 0.0305
(0.0034) (0.196) (0.755)
Business School 0.0670b 0.0515c 0.0756
(0.0158) (0.084) (0.183)
Ph.D. 0.0703c 0.0773 0.0617
(0.0823) (0.121) (0.380)
Race 0.0177  0.0053 0.1477c
(0.5765) (0.857) (0.074)
Gender  0.0031 0.0257  0.0353
(0.9051) (0.352) (0.496)
Tenure Track 0.1510a 0.176a 0.1404b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025)
Published 0.0275 0.0172 0.0286
(0.2937) (0.517) (0.601)
P Productivity 1.92 103  a 1.32 10 5  c 2.00 10 5
(0.0095) (0.076) (0.211)
Citizen/Green Card 0.0500c 0.0198 0.1180
(0.0988) (0.487) (0.131)
New Hires 0.0518b 0.0233 0.0985c
(0.0380) (0.389) (0.061)
Adjusted R2 0.4059 0.3555 0.1327
Number of Obs. 207 132 75
P values are given in parentheses.
a. significant at the 1 percent level
b. significant at the 5 percent level
c. significant at the 10 percent level
of differences technique, which allows us to make positive statements about the sig-
nificance of variables in the estimates reported in Table 3.
Table 3 indicates that whether the hiring department is in a public or private
university has no significant effect on the salary of the new hire once other determi-
nants of entry-level salaries are taken into account. Three other variables—COL,
Gender, and Published—have no significant effect in either Model 1 or 2. The fact
that COL is not significant is mildly surprising. The obvious explanation for this is
that departments that are located in areas with higher costs of living also offer com-
pensating amenities that offset these costs. This is consistent with a literature that516 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
documents amenities that enhance the quality of life in higher-cost urban areas [Roback
1982; 1988; Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn, 1988]. Nevertheless, these compensating
amenities may not fully offset differences in costs of living, and our expectations were
that COL would be positive and significant [DuMond et al. 1999].
Gender had a negative coefficient (being male had a negative impact on wages),
but consistent with Formby et al. [1993] the coefficient is insignificant. The fact that
Published was insignificant is not all that surprising given the possible range in pub-
lication quality.
Consistent with the results of a decade earlier, we find that being hired into a
business school has a significant and positive effect on salaries in Model 1 and for
persons hired into ranked departments in Model 2. In unranked departments, being
hired into a department within a business school has no significant impact on salary.
The results for Race differ in Models 1 and 2. Recall that Race is a categorical
variable that measures whether the hiring department reports that the new hire is
white (non-Hispanic) or some other race. For unranked departments the results for
Model 2 show a premium for white (non-Hispanic) entry-level economists in 1998-99.
However, for ranked departments and in Model 1 Race is not significant. This sug-
gests that Race influences entry-level salaries quite differently in ranked and unranked
departments. The data show that only 12 percent of unranked departments hired
nonwhite persons while in ranked departments the percentage was a little over 30
percent.
Some departments hired more than one entry-level economist in 1998-99. For
example, one responding department reported hiring six entry-level faculty in one
year. The fact that some departments were filling multiple positions led us to investi-
gate whether a search for several economists might impact the salaries of the new
hires. For the entire survey (Model 1), this variable was positive and significant, a
result that parallels the findings of Formby et al. [1993].
The analysis reveals that the most interesting contributor to entry-level salaries
is whether the new hire is on the tenure track. Table 3 reveals that Tenure Track is
the only variable that is positive and significant in each of the earnings equations
estimated for Model 1 and 2. Being hired on the tenure track adds approximately 19
percent to the salary of a new hire in a ranked department and slightly more than 15
percent to a new hire in an unranked department. For the overall survey, being hired
on the tenure track added a 16 percent premium.7
It is often of interest to test for structural stability in an overall regression equa-
tion such as Model 1. In Model 1 we assume that all of the usual regression ordinary-
least squares assumptions apply throughout the entire sample. When applied to check
for structural stability, an F-test, sometimes referred to as a Chow test, is a straight-
forward way of testing whether some of the estimated coefficients in the overall model
differ for a subset of the data. We used Chow tests to investigate whether some struc-
tural differences existed in Model 1. Results from the Chow tests are reported in
Table 4. We find significant structural differences in the sample when the data are
separated into ranked and unranked departments. In particular, the Chow tests for
Business School and Tenure Track are significant, indicating that structural differ-
ences exist. Thus, the two equations in Model 2 provide an improved estimate com-
pared to Model 1. As a practical matter this means that the market for entry-level517 ENTRY-LEVEL ACADEMIC SALARIES
economists works differently depending upon whether ranked or unranked depart-
ments are hiring. This finding parallels an analogous result in Formby et al. [1993].
CHARACTERTISTICS OF THOSE HIRED ON THE TENURE TRACK
Tenure-track status is the only variable that is significant in all specifications
and it is clearly a powerful determinant for the entire survey across all departments,
ranked as well as unranked. The survey provides information that allows us to exam-
ine the characteristics of those hired on the tenure track relative to those hired into
non-tenure-track positions. We use a Probit analysis to distinguish the significant
characteristics of those persons who were hired on the tenure track from those that
were not. Since Tenure Track is a categorical variable that has 0 and 1 values, a
Probit model is an appropriate method for investigating this issue. In specifying the
Probit model we note that several of the variables are specific to the individual. For
example Race, Gender, Published, Citizen/Green Card, and Ph.D. are clearly indi-
vidual specific. In addition, we interpret P-Productivity as indirectly reflecting the
potential productivity of the new hire. The logic of this is straightforward: ceteris
paribus, a department with a highly productive research faculty is expected to pro-
duce Ph.D. students that are well trained and productive themselves. The other vari-
ables in Table 5 (H-Productivity, Public, Highest Degree, Business School, New Hires,
and Ranked) all measure characteristics of the hiring department.
Table 5 reports the results of the Probit analysis. We find that three variables are
highly significant. Accepting a position at a public institution (Public), completing all
requirements for the Ph.D. degree (Ph.D.), and receiving graduate training in a de-
partment with a highly productive research faculty (P-Productivity) are all signifi-
cant characteristics in attaining tenure-track positions.
The following discussion examines the magnitude of the influence that Public,
Ph.D. and P-Productivity has in distinguishing between entry-level economists who
are hired into tenure-track jobs and those accepting academic jobs that have no chance
of tenure. To address this issue we use procedures outlined by [Greene 1993, 636-43].
The results are reported in Table 6. To interpret Table 6 requires a brief discussion of
the characteristics of the baseline measure we construct and use in gauging the im-
pacts of the variables on the probability of being hired on the tenure track. The char-
acteristics of the “representative” or “average” new hire are used in constructing the
baseline. Compared to an average new hire (the baseline), how do individual-specific
and hiring department-specific variables influence the probability of being hired on
and off the tenure track?
The characteristics of the average or baseline new hire are as follows. As stated
previously, the productivity measures used in Scott and Mitias [1996] are based on
the number of pages published in 36 academic journals from 1984 through 1993. For
P-Productivity, the data reveal that the average research productivity of the produc-
ing department was 2,149 pages over the sample period, which corresponds to a rank
of 22 out 240. For H-Productivity, the data also show that, on average, the new hire’s
job was in a department with a productivity level of 637 pages, which corresponds to
a rank of 66 out of 240. Thus, when ranked by productivity the average producing518 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
department stood 44 slots higher than the average hiring department in 1998-99.
This result is consistent with Pieper and Willis’ [1999] finding that economics faculty
with positions in Ph.D.-granting departments received their training and Ph.D.’s from
higher-ranked departments. Therefore, in constructing the baseline we use 2,149 for
the productivity of the producing department and 637 for the hiring department. The
data reveal that, on average, public institutions hired more entry-level economists.
Further, the average new hire accepted a job in a department that did not offer a
Ph.D. and was not administratively located in a business school. On average, the
potential hire reported having completed all degree requirements and was a white
(non-Hispanic) male. As noted earlier, 62 percent of the new hires in the survey had
at least one publication. Moreover, most of the new hires were U.S. citizens or had
green cards and most departments hired only one entry-level person in 1998-99.
Table 6 reveals that the baseline (average) new hire had an 82 percent probability
of being a tenure-track hire. This is interesting in itself, but when any of the charac-
teristics of the individual are changed (that is, as we depart from the baseline), the
significance of that particular variable is more clearly revealed. We focus here only on
the significant variables in the Probit model reported in Table 5. Ceteris paribus, if
the new hire accepts a job at a private institution instead of a public institution the
probability of being a tenure-track hire falls by approximately 5 percentage points.
The most dramatic effect takes place if the new hire has not fulfilled all of her or his
degree requirements, in which case the probability of being hired on the tenure track
falls by 24.7 percentage points.
Table 6 reveals that the productivity of the producing department has a positive
and systematic impact on the probability that an entry-level economist is hired into a
tenure-track position. Ceteris paribus, if we assume that the new hire receives her or
his training in the most productive department instead of the 22nd ranked depart-
ment, the probability of being hired on the tenure track increases by approximately 8
percentage points. Conversely, if the new hire receives their Ph.D. training in a de-
TABLE 4
Chow Tests
 All Departments Ranked Departments Unranked Departments
With Without With Without With    Without
 intercept intercept intercept intercept intercept intercept
Ranked  2.174      6.140 — — — —
(0.012)  (0.000)
Tenure  3.049      3.369 2.172       2.862 1.573          2.042
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.015)      (0.002) (0.129)        (0.017)
Business   2.578     2.017 1.656        1.700 1.891           2.900
(0.003)  (0.047) (0.081)      (0.076) (0.062)         (0.004)
P-values are given in parentheses.519 ENTRY-LEVEL ACADEMIC SALARIES
partment ranked below 22, say 50th, the probability of receiving a tenure-track job
declines by 3.0 percentage points compared to the baseline. Table 6 indicates receiv-
ing Ph.D. training in highly ranked departments (the elite among the top 10) has a
sizable impact on getting a tenure-track job. However, economists trained in depart-
ments ranked from 20th to 50th experience only small decreases in tenure-track prob-
abilities compared to the baseline.
CONCLUSIONS
This study uses survey data to investigate the determinants of entry-level sala-
ries of academic economists in the 1998-99 academic year. Unlike previous studies of
the labor market for economists we focus on tenure- and non-tenure-track jobs. We
identify a number of important factors influencing the entry-level market for econo-
mists. In 1998-99 more than 20 percent of all new entry-level hires in economics
accepted non-tenure earning positions and we find Tenure Track to be a large, signifi-
cant and robust determinant of entry-level salaries.
We also find that the market works quite differently depending upon whether the
hiring department is ranked in terms of the research productivity of its faculty. Chow
tests reveal that estimating the determinants of salaries separately for ranked and
unranked hiring departments results in improved understanding of the entry-level
labor market in 1998-99. The variable Tenure Track is important in both market
segments. In ranked departments, being hired on the tenure track adds more than 19
percent to the entry-level salary. In unranked departments the tenure-track premium
is slightly more than 15 percent.
Business schools with ranked departments pay a premium, but those in unranked
departments do not. Further, in ranked departments the productivity of the faculty
in which the new hires did their Ph.D. work results in both higher salaries and im-
TABLE 5
Probit Estimates of Being Hired on the Tenure Track
Constant  0.7406
(0.1312)
















P-Productivity 0.1507 10 3  b
(0.0358)




P-values are given in parentheses.
a. significant at the 1 percent level
b. significant at the 5 percent level
c. significant at the 10 percent level520 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
proved job placement in the sense that the new hires obtain positions with higher-
ranked departments than would have been possible if they had done their Ph.D. work
in lower ranked departments. The ranking of the department in which the new hires
did Ph.D. work is not a significant determinant of salaries in the unranked segment
of the market.
Compared to other studies of the academic market for economists, a novel feature
of this paper is that it investigates the characteristics of individual economists and
hiring departments that influence the probability of being hired into a tenure-track
job. Three variables are shown to be highly significant in distinguishing those who
were hired into tenure-track academic positions in economics from those accepting
non-tenure-track jobs. Not surprisingly, we find that having completed all require-
ments for the Ph.D. degree is an extremely important determinant of the probability
of acquiring a tenure-track job. We also find that accepting a position at a public
rather than a private college or university significantly influences the probability
that the job is on the tenure track. Finally, Ph.D. training in a highly productive
department has a large and significant effect on the probability of receiving a tenure-
track position.
It is natural to explore the following question, which will be of interest to some
readers: What guidance do our results provide for young would-be economists who
TABLE 6
Probability of Being Hired on the Tenure Track
Probability of Being Percent Changed
Hired on the Tenure Track Compared to the Baseline
Baselinea 82.0 —
Private instead of Public 77.3  4.7
ABD instead of Ph.D. 57.3  24.7
Productivity of the Producing Department
  Highest Ranked 90.3 +8.3
  10th Ranked 85.4 +3.4
  20th Ranked 81.9  0.1
  30th Ranked 80.5  1.5
  40th Ranked 79.6  2.4
  50th Ranked 79.0  3.0
a. The Baseline is constructed using the average characteristics of the entire sample, which are as follows:
P-Productivity = 2149 pages, which corresponds to a rank of 22 for the producing department,
H-Productivity = 637 pages, which corresponds to a rank of 66 for the hiring department,
Public = 1, the average new hire is employed by a public four-year college or university,
Ph.D. = 0, the average new hire is employed in a non-Ph.D. granting department,
Business School = 0, the average new hire’s job is not in a business school,
Race = 1, the average new hire is white and non-Hispanic,
Gender = 1, the average new hire is male,
Published = 1, the average new hire has published at least one paper,
Citizen/Green Card = 1, the average new hire is either a U.S. citizen or has a green card, and
Hires = 0, the average new hire is in a department that employed only one entry-level economist in 1998-
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think they may want to pursue an academic career and who are particularly con-
cerned about the first job? Our results are consistent with the following advice. If
young would-be economists are interested in an academic career with a high-paying
first job that provides a chance for tenure, they should do their Ph.D. work at the
most highly ranked (research productive) department possible. Further, they should
complete their Ph.D. work in a timely manner. Finally, they should seriously think
about pursuing an entry-level job in a department that is administratively located
within a business school and within a public university.
We close by focusing on the following question: What are some of the factors of
interest in the entry-level market that our study has failed to identify and uncover?
The paper provides a number of interesting results that confirm casual impressions
concerning how the entry-level market for academic economists works. But many
other equally interesting questions are not addressed. First, we note that the quality
of a department hinges not only on research productivity as in this paper, but also on
teaching. Two equally ranked research departments may differ markedly in terms of
teaching, which may be reflected in attrition rates of Ph.D. students.
Another issue not addressed, which could be important involves compensating
wage differentials and trade-offs, both of which are almost always at work in labor
markets. For example, we find that an entry-level economist in a department in a
business school in ranked departments is paid a salary premium, but the classes the
instructor must teach may be larger and the economics faculty in a business school
may have to teach large numbers of students who have no interest in economics. The
business school premium may in fact be a compensating differential for putting up
with large numbers of uninterested students. Similarly, the newly hired economist
has preferences, which may not be consistent with choices that maximize the entry-
level salary and getting a tenure-track appointment. For example, some of the new
hires who accepted non-tenure-track appointments in 1998-99 may have received
exactly what they were seeking—a temporary job.
The questions we have not addressed lead us to be cautious in offering guidance
to young would-be economists. Nevertheless, we are confident in suggesting that they
pursue the highest quality Ph.D. program consistent with their abilities, that they
complete the Ph.D. degree and that entry-level, tenure-track jobs are more likely to
be found in public colleges and universities.
NOTES
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Lawrence. This paper was supported by research assistance from the Center for Business and Eco-
nomic Research at the University of Alabama.
1. A few responding institutions hired more than one entry-level economist. The sample size of 207 is
the total number of new hires for which complete information was available.
2. Formby et al. [1993] found that after controlling for other factors influencing salaries, the gender
differences in 1987-1988 are not significant. We find and report similar results below.522 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
3. A casual review of JOE reveals that approximately 80 percent of the academic jobs listed were ten-
ure-track positions, which indicates that in 1998-99, employers were able to find candidates with
qualifications that suited the position.
4. ACCRA provides cost of living indices for a number of urban areas, but not for all of the areas in
which the colleges and universities in our sample are located. We can construct COL measures for
almost all of the areas in our sample using homefair.com. In a small number of cases where the
hiring department was located in an area for which a homefair.com index could not be computed, the
flexibility of homefair.com allowed us to select a nearby geographical area with a similar population
size and use its COL as a proxy. For the limited set of observations for which both ACCRA and
homefair.com COL measures are available, we found no statistically significant effect of the COL
index. However, theoretically, a COL measure should logically be included in the econometric speci-
fication. Therefore, to maximize our sample size we use the homefair.com indices because this per-
mits us to use all 207 observations.
5. We group economists with green cards with U.S. citizens because the number of green card holders
is small and they have the same rights to employment as U.S. citizens.
6. P-productivity is also significant in the ranked equation of Model 2, but at the 10 percent level of
significance (p-value = 0.076). P-productivity is not significant in unranked equation of Model 2.
7. The conversion into percentage differentials is given by (ecoefficient – 1)   100.
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